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Oil and gas farmout agreements are important devices in spreading the risks of oil and gas exploration
and development on the Outer Continental Shelf, as well as in onshore operations. In fact, because both
the costs and risks (as well as the rewards) of offshore development are greater than those usually
associated with onshore operations, oil and gas farmout agreements may play a more important role in
operations on the Outer Continental Shelf than in onshore operations.
The structure of an Outer Continental Shelf farmout agreement does not differ substantially from that
of its onshore counterpart. The function of farmout agreements is essentially the same whatever the
environment in which they are used. Thus, there are relatively few essential issues that determine the
basic structure of the farmout agreement. I have discussed these issues at length elsewhere.1(2) In this
paper I will simply summarize the points made in that more extensive paper and point out some
interesting characteristics of OCS farmout agreements.
A.   The Purpose of the Farmout
Because the farmor — the entity farming out the lease for development — generally proposes the
farmout agreement, it is the farmor's purposes that are usually reflected in the agreements supplied to me
for review. The farmor's reasons for farming out an OCS lease may include (1) lease preservation, (2)
lease salvage, (3) risk sharing, (4) exploration and evaluation, (5) access to market, (6) obtaining reserves,
(7) drilling an “obligation” well, and (8) testing a business relationship.2(3) In each case, the farmor gives
up a portion of its interest in its lease or leases to another to further what it regards as its own interest. The
goals of the parties, particularly the goals of the farmor, may profoundly affect the structure of the
agreement. For example, where the farmor seeks to salvage some of its investment in a lease by enticing
someone else to take the risk of conducting drilling operations on it, the farmout agreement is likely to
reflect very liberal terms; it suits the farmor's purpose to make the deal attractive to entice the farmee to
drill. In contrast, when the farmor's primary purpose in farming out is to develop exploratory information
to be used to evaluate other perspective drill sites in the area, the farmout agreement is likely to contain
extensive and explicit requirements for drilling and testing.
Because large lease bonuses are generally paid for OCS leases, lease maintenance or lease salvage are
probably the most common purposes of OCS farmout agreements. The best prospects are drilled early in
their lease's primary terms. Drilling on less attractive prospects gets postponed from year to year until the
last year of the primary term when a farmout is proposed. As a result, the terms of OCS farmout
agreements are generally reasonably liberal toward the farmee, but the dates by which the farmee must
perform are likely to be critical.3(4)
B.   The Duty Imposed: Option or Obligation
Like onshore farmout agreements, most OCS farmout agreements make drilling an earning well an
option rather than an obligation. Some agreements provide specifically that the farmee “may commence”
drilling, but that the farmee will earn only if a well capable of production is obtained. Others provide that
the “farmee agrees to commence” the drilling of a test well but conclude that “the failure of farmee to
commence the initial test well...will not result in farmee's liability to farmor for damages, but shall result
only in farmee's loss of all rights under this Agreement.” Either formulation makes drilling an option
rather than a obligation.
The primary significance of classifying a farmout agreement as an option farmout or an obligation
farmout is the effect of the failure to perform under the agreement. When the farmout is drafted as an
option to drill, failure to drill will cost the farmee the benefits it might have earned. When the farmee is
obligated to drill, failure to drill may expose the farmee to very substantial liabilities for breach of its
agreement. In a majority of states, including Oklahoma and Louisiana, the remedy for breach of an
obligation to drill is apparently the cost of drilling the promised well.4(5) In a minority of states, including
Texas, the remedy is the benefit that the one party would have received had the other drilled the well as
promised.5(6) That benefit may be measured by the production that would have resulted had the well been
drilled as promised. Other available measures of damages include the value of the retained interest or the
value of the information the drilling would have developed.6(7)
C.          The Substitute Well Provision
The substitute well provision of a farmout agreement addresses the rights of the parties in the event
that the initial well is not drilled to completion. Generally, farmout agreements provide that if physical
conditions in the hole or mechanical problems with drilling equipment prevent completion of the earning
well, the farmee earns an option to drill a substitute earning well.7(8)
Substitute well provisions are especially important to a farmee where the farmee has an obligation to
drill the initial well. Even where drilling is an option rather than an obligation, however, the substitute
well provision may be very important to a farmee because the clause is a vehicle by which the farmee
may be able to preserve the benefits that it sought to earn by entering into the farmout agreement.8(9)
Substitute well provisions are particularly important in Outer Continental Shelf farmout agreements
because of the high risks and expenses associated with drilling offshore, and because of the possibility
that the earning well will discover substantial quantities of hydrocarbons, but that the farmee will not
wish to construct a platform in that location or may not be permitted to do so. Recognizing these risks,
some offshore farmout agreements give the farmee the right to a substitute well if the initial well is not
completed as a producing well without requiring that mechanical or geologic conditions prevent
completion as a producer.9(10)
 
D.          Defining the Objective Depth
The “objective depth,” or the “contract depth” as it is sometimes called, is the depth to which the
farmee must drill to earn its interest under the farmout agreement. Objective depth usually is described
either by reference to the number of feet to be drilled or by a description of the formation to be explored.
In offshore farmout agreements, objective depth is sometimes defined by reference to mud weight, in
recognition that unknown geologic circumstances make it in appropriate to designate either a definite
footage or a specific target formation.10(11)
Objective depth provisions are particularly important in OCS farmout agreements because the hostile
environment in which OCS operations take place substantially compound the problems of ascertaining
when the objective depth has been reached. Either designating the objective depth by footage or by
reference to a formation may cause interpretative difficulties. Where the objective depth is measured by
footage, disputes may arise over how footage is to be measured. No industry custom or usage exists as to
whether a footage reference is a reference to measured depth, the distance down the hole actually drilled,
or to vertical depth, the vertical distance from the top to the bottom of the hole. Apparently, there is
general agreement that the starting point for depth measurement in OCS operations is sea level. Where the
method of describing the objective depth is to refer to a formation that the farmee will test, the risk arises
that reasonable and prudent geologists will not agree whether that formation has or has not been tested. A
device that may minimize this risk is to refer to a “control well,” another well that has tested the
formation sought.11(12)
E.          Testing and Confidentiality Provisions
Lawyers sometimes pay insufficient attention to the schedule of tests required in a farmout,
considering them technical boilerplate. Tests should not be so considered. Testing provisions are always
an essential issue of a farmout agreement because the tests that must be performed if the farmee is to earn
add substantially to the costs and risks of the farmee. Performance of the testing schedule is both a
condition of earning and a substantial cost factor to the farmee.
OCS farmout agreements generally contain more extensive and explicit testing provisions that
onshore farmout contracts. This difference probably follows from the fact that data from wells drilled on
the Outer Continental Shelf is more valuable than data from onshore wells. The OCS is a relatively new
drilling area. Fewer exploratory wells have been drilled than onshore.
 
Furthermore, wells are more expensive to drill in the OCS than onshore, so that fewer wells will be
developed even in developed areas. As a result, there is little information available from sources other
than drilling operators, and such data as is available is very expensive. It is in the farmor's interest to
require the farmee to test fully the earning well and share the information.
In addition, some tests not always required in onshore farmout agreements are de facto a prerequisite
to qualifying a well as capable of production in paying quantities under 30 C.F.R. § 250.11, which
classifies resistivity or induction electric logs, sidewall cores and wireline formation tests and
mud-logging analyses as “reliable evidence.” Because the regulation specifically designates such tests,
farmout drafters frequently require them.
Offshore farmout agreements also almost always bar or limit the transfer of testing information
developed.12(13) The presence of such confidentiality provisions reflects the relative value of OCS testing
information, sets up a standard for damages, and chills the casual exchange of drilling information.
F.          What It Takes To Earn
What the farmee has to do to earn its interest under the farmout agreement is a key characteristic of
the agreement, whether the farmout covers OCS lands or onshore properties. “Produce-to-earn” farmouts
require the farmee to drill, test, and obtain production. “Drill-to-earn” farmouts require only drilling and
testing.13(14) In Outer Continental Shelf operations as onshore, most farmout agreements require that the
farmee secure “production” in order to earn under the farmout agreement. In fact, all of the farmout
agreements that I collected covering OCS operations were of the “produce to earn” type rather than the
“drill to earn” type. That is not surprising; because of the relatively short length of the primary terms of
OCS leases (generally five years), there simply is not a lot of time for exploration and evaluation once a
lease is taken. Furthermore, as has been noted, because of high lease acquisition costs and drilling costs,
the purpose of OCS farmouts is usually lease maintenance or lease salvage.
In contrast to their onshore counterparts, however, Outer Continental Shelf farmout agreements
generally do not leave the determination of whether the earning well is capable of production in paying
quantities to the common law. Instead, OCS farmout agreements usually specifically condition the
earning of the farmee's interest upon classification of the well as capable of producing in paying
quantities by the Minerals Management Service. For example:
“Should farmee drill the initial test well, substitute well or a subsequent well, to the objective
depth and should the well be certified pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 250.11 by the Minerals
Management Service, and should farmee give farmor written notice of its intention to set a
platform or case on to produce oil and/or gas from the farm-out lands, then said well should be
deemed the earning well. Thereafter, farmor shall assign an interest in the operating rights for the
farm-out lands as stated below.”
Section 250.11 of 30 C.F.R. tracks the common-law definition of “paying quantities.” “Paying quantities”
is defined as “production of oil, gas, or both in quantities sufficient to yield a return in excess of the costs,
after completion of the well, of producing the hydrocarbons at the wellhead.” The regulations provide
how that determination is to be made by the Minerals Management Service, specifying a variety of tests
that may be submitted as evidence of production capability.
In addition to drilling a well, the farmee under most OCS farmout agreements must notify the farmor
in writing of its intent to build the facilities necessary to produce before it earns.14(15) In contrast to
onshore operations, one who drills offshore must always address the physical and economic problems of
transporting production to market.
G.          What is Earned
1.                Operating Rights, Not Working Interest
Because of MMS regulations, OCS farmout agreements provide for assignment of operating rights,
rather than working interests.15(16) The farmor remains the owner of record even after the farmout
acreage is earned and assigned.
2.                Leases and Acreage Earned
OCS farmout agreements generally transfer to the farmee all of the farmor's operating rights in the
lease block for the drilling of a single well.16(17) In contrast, onshore agreements frequently transfer just
the wellsite acreage, or the wellsite acreage and a fractional interest in acreage outside the well site. The
difference in structure is as a result of economics and regulations. The costs and risks of offshore drilling
are substantially greater than onshore, so that most OCS farmouts are motivated by the farmer's desire to
preserve the lease and farmees generally have the bargaining power to insist upon full assignment.
Moreover, the MMS policies and regulations discourage partial assignments.17(18) Finally, drilling a
single well maintains the entire OCS lease, which is usually the farmor's purpose in entering into the
farmout agreement.18(19)
OCS farmout agreements generally deal with the problem of participation of the farmor in additional
drilling operations before payout of the earning well by giving the farmor the option of converting its
overriding royalty in the block assigned to the farmee to a working interest.19(20) The tax benefits of the
intangible drilling cost deduction are preserved for the farmee by making the conversion ineffective as to
the earning well until after payout.20(21)
3.                Depth Limitations
Earning depth limitations are as common in OCS farmout agreements as they are in their onshore
counterparts. Typically, OCS farmouts limit the rights acquired by the farmee “from the surface down to
the stratigraphic equivalent of the total depth drilled, plus 100 feet.21(22) As I have discussed
elsewhere,22(23) in my opinion, the term “stratigraphic equivalent”23(24) is over-used and uncertain of
meaning. It has a deceptively precise sound, suggesting a straightforward scientific test that does not
exist. In fact, “stratigraphic equivalent” has several different meanings, none of which may exist in a
particular situation. If the term is to be used at all, the farmout should state a maximum footage beyond
which the farmee's rights will not extend.
4.                The Royalty Reservation and Payout
Like their onshore counterparts, OCS farmout agreements generally reserve an overriding royalty
interest to the farmor until the earning well has paid out.24(25) The overriding royalty is generally
expressed in sixths, instead of eighths, however, reflecting the practice of measuring the government's
royalty in sixths. In addition, as I have discussed, the overriding royalty is generally reserved in the whole
block assigned, rather than in just the earning well, and is subject to conversion to a working interest
should the farmee elect to drill additional wells.
Conceptually, the overriding royalty reserved may include existing burdens on the lease or exclude
them.25(26) Onshore agreements overriding royalty reservations frequently are of the inclusive type; e.g.,
the farmee reserves the difference between existing burdens and 25% of 8/8ths of production as an
overriding royalty. In contrast, all of the overriding royalty reservations in the offshore farmout
agreements I reviewed were of the exclusive type; i.e. the royalty was in addition to existing
burdens.26(27)
 
The royalty reservation is also affected by the definition of “payout” — the point at which the
farmor's overriding royalty is convertible to a portion of the working interest. Payout must not be defined
more narrowly than the tax regulations permit, lest the benefits of the intangible drilling cost deduction be
lost.27(28) Often, OCS farmout agreements define payout to include costs that would probably not be
required by the tax rules. A portion of lease acquisition costs may be included, because offshore leases are
very expensive and the farmee may be required to reimburse the farmor as well as pay drilling costs. The
costs of drilling platforms, well protector platforms, production platforms, pipelines or other drilling or
production facilities may also be defined as costs to be recovered before payout because they add
substantially to the farmee's costs of performance.28(29)
 
H.          Administrative Matters
1.                Suspension of Production
Even if an offshore well is capable of production in paying quantities, the OCS lease may be lost of
there is no actual production unless the operator files for suspension of production approval29(30) and
supports its application with a Schedule of Development.30(31) Since the farmee has an economic
incentive to make the filing and preserve the lease, most offshore farmout agreements do not address this
potential problem, other than to place the burden of filings generally on the farmee. If the earning well is
capable only of marginal production, however, the interests of the farmee and the farmor may not be the
same. One drafting device might be to expand the reassignment clause of the farmout to extend to the
farmor the right to demand reassignment of the lease unless the farmee files for a suspension of
production order on a non-producing lease within a reasonable time of the determination that the earning
well is capable of producing in paying quantities. Another device is to designate the farmor as operator
for the purpose of filing for the suspension of production approval. For example:
Suspension of Production Approval. Should the Initial Well or any Subsequent Well(s), if any,
drilled under the terms of this Farmout Agreement be completed as one capable of producing oil
and/or gas as provided in 4.1(a), Farmee will apply for and diligently seek any approval of a
Suspension of Production covering the Lease from the Minerals Management Service, if same is
necessary, to maintain the Lease in force and effect. In the event Farmee fails to diligently seek
approval of a Suspension of Production by ___ ___________, Farmor shall have the right at
Farmor's option to be designated Operator for the purpose of seeking such a suspension of
Production.
The farmor should have a vehicle to preserve the lease even if the farmee does not choose to do so.
2.                Recording of Assignments
 
In addition, OCS assignments, like assignments of rights to onshore federal leases, should probably
be recorded in the appropriate state land records to avoid argument whether filing with the MMS is
sufficient to establish constructive notice.31(32) Generally, assignments pursuant to OCS farmout
agreements are filed in the land records of the county adjacent to the offshore area in addition to the
appropriate office of the MMS.
In dealing with OCS leases as with all federal leases, a question arises as to whether Department of
Interior approval is necessary for the farmout agreement itself as an assignment of rights. Both practice
and conventional wisdom apparently are to the contrary.32(33) Where an assignment of record title or
operating rights is made in the farmout at the time the agreement is executed, however, there probably is a
requirement under the Interior Department's assignment regulations that the farmout agreement be filed
even though record title is not earned until the earning well is completed.33(34) Because of tax and
bankruptcy considerations,34(35) present assignments of interest are frequently used in farmout
agreements. Where the present assignment form of farmout is used, an assignment of operating rights
must be filed on the Department's prescribed form within ninety days.35(36)
According to the Law of Federal Oil and Gas Leases, the policy of the Department of Interior is to
decline to approve assignments which provide for automatic termination and reversion to the
grantor.36(37) This throws into question the common structure of farmout agreements of the present
assignment type. Most present assignment farmouts are drafted so that the farmee is given a sublease of
rights by the farmor that automatically terminates if drilling operations are not commenced within the
agreed time. Again, according to the Law of Federal Oil and Gas Leases, however, if such a farmout also
includes a reassignment provision obligating the farmee to reassign the lease to the farmor in the event
that the sublease expires, then the assignment will be accepted for filing and approved.37(38) Most
farmout agreements contain specific provisions for reassignment in order to avoid a possible cloud on
title. In dealing with OCS farmout agreements, there is an additional regulatory reason for the
reassignment provision.
I.                Liability, Insurance and Indemnification Provisions
There is greater liability exposure in OCS farmout agreements than under onshore agreements for
both farmees and farmors. The OCS is a dangerous work environment, which increases the risk that injury
or damage will occur that will subject the farmee to liability. The often-dangerous conditions also
increase the risks of vicarious liability under one of the “usual” vicarious liability theories such as mining
partnership or joint venture. OCS farmout agreements often include language disclaiming such liabilities,
but such “bootstrap” efforts may be worth little more than the paper upon which they are written.38(39)
The risk of liability as a record owner is also broader in OCS farmout agreements than in onshore
operations. One reason is Minerals Management Service regulations, which require the designation of a
single operator of record for a lease.39(40) The MMS looks primarily to the operator and the lease owner
to fulfill obligations imposed by the statutes, regulations and lease terms. For a variety of reasons, the
farmee may not be designated as the lease operator. Thus, the farmor (or possibly a contract operator)
may find itself confronting claims from the MMS for alleged failures of the farmee.
In addition, federal statutes and regulations impose generally broader liability upon record title
owners than does state law. For example, as a general rule, a leasee of fee mineral interests is not liable
for injuries or losses caused by a farmee or a contractor.40(41) In contrast, the federal regulations
governing OCS operations specifically impose the duty to perform safe and workman-like operations
upon the leasee.41(42) Another example is the offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund Act,42(43) which imposes
joint and several liability for pollution upon both the owners and operators of offshore oil facilities.43(44)
The insurance and indemnification provisions of OCS farmout agreements are more important than
those in onshore farmout contracts44(45) because the costs and risks of liability, as well as the scope of
liability, are greater in operations on the Outer Continental Shelf. If a drilling rig collapses offshore both
the resulting loss of life and the cost of recovering it are likely to be substantially greater than onshore.
Onshore drilling rigs are not at risk of being hit by ships or crashed by helicopters. If pollution occurs, the
liability may be much greater and far reaching in Outer Continental Shelf operations than onshore. As a
result, insurance provisions in OCS farmout agreements generally set higher minimum coverages than
onshore agreements and require types of coverage not usually seen in onshore operations, notably
watercraft liability insurance,45(46) aircraft liability insurance,46(47) well control and environmental
insurance,47(48) and insurance to cover liabilities under legislation peculiar to maritime operations.48(49)
In addition, offshore farmouts usually contain provisions disclaiming joint liability.49(50)
Indemnification clauses in farmout agreements go hand in hand with insurance provisions.50(51)
Because liability limits may be exceeded or insurance carriers may deny liability, most OCS farmout
agreements contain clauses requiring the farmee to indemnify the farmor against liability.51(52) A
discussion of indemnification provisions and the Texas and Louisiana Anti-Indemnity statutes has
preceded this paper.
J.                Conclusion
Farmout agreements play an important role in the exploration and development operations of the oil
and gas industry worldwide. There is no standard form for such agreements, but there are
commonly-encountered issues that are essential to their effectiveness. An analysis based upon those
essential issues is the best way that I know to analyze the similarities and differences of farmout
agreements.
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one part of the block, but the owner does not wish or cannot afford to build a platform on the remaining
portion of the block.
18 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 17)
17MMS policy is not to approve assignments of operating rights to less than a quarter block.
Furthermore, 30 C.F.R. § 250.190 et. seq. establishes a regime for pooling that discourages partial block
assignments.
19 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 18)
1830 C.F.R. § 250.13.
20 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 19)
19For example:
The overriding royalty interest to be reserved in favor of Farmor as provided above shall be subject to
an option to convert said override into a _____ percent (_____%) of six-sixths (6/6ths) working
interest. The reserved override as well as any working interest conversion shall be proportionately
reduced if Farmor owns less than 100% of the working interest in the Earned Acreage. The option for
Farmor to convert to a working interest in the Earned Acreage shall begin upon the earlier of the
following occurrences: (a) within thirty (30) days of receipt of notice from Farmee that their receipts,
less royalties, including the herein reserved overriding royalty interest and taxes from the sale of
production from the Earning Well are equal to the cost of drilling, testing and completing and
equipping as capable of production the Earning Well, together with the cost of operating such well
during the payout period; or (b) within thirty (30) days of receipt of notice from Farmee of their intent
to commence an subsequent well on the Earned Acreage, together with information regarding the
location, depth, and estimate cost of the well, or (c) within sixty (60) days of receipt of notice from
Farmee of their interest to set a platform to develop the Earned Acreage. If the Farmee elects to begin
operations on a subsequent well (of which they shall have given notice as provided in (b) above) prior
to expiration of the thirty-day notice period, Farmor shall not be entitled to receive data from that well
until such time as it has notified Farmee in writing of its election with respect to whether to convert
its reserved overriding royalty interest to a working interest, as above provided. If, upon the
occurrence of events described in (b) or (c) above, Farmor does elect to convert its overriding royalty
interest to working interest, such conversion shall be suspended solely as to the Earning Well until
such time as payout thereof shall have occurred, at which time the conversion shall then become
effective in regard thereto.
21 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 20)
20See the last sentence of the clause supra note 19.
22 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 21)
21See, e.g., the clause supra note 15.
23 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 22)
22Lowe, supra note 1 at 825-827.
24 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 23)
23Generally, “stratigraphic equivalent” is intended to give the farmee the right to the benefits of its
risk-taking by awarding it the right to the sedimentary strata it has drilled at whatever depth they are
found.
25 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 24)
24Lowe, supra note 1 at 768, 829-830.
26 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 25)
25For discussion and examples, see Lowe, supra note 1 at 830-832.
27 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 26)
26For example:
[The assignment shall] Reserve to Farmor an overriding royalty interest (ORRI) of ___________ of
6/6ths of all liquid and/or gaseous hydrocarbon substances produced and/or saved, either through
testing of the earning well or production of the earning well, from or attributable to the farmout lands.
28 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 27)
27For discussion of the intangible drilling cost deduction and the complete payout limitation, see
Lowe, supra note 1 at 776-768, 833-836.
29 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 28)
28For example:
Payout. Payout shall occur when the “Net Proceeds,” as hereinafter defined, from the sale of all
production, on a well by well basis from the Initial Well or any Subsequent Well(s) equals the
total tangible and intangible costs of drilling, sidetracking, equipping (an oil well through the oil
storage tanks and a gas well through the Christmas tree), testing, completing said well for
production, and operating said well prior to payout provided such costs shall not include platform
costs or the cost of facilities which also serve other wells with a bottomhole location outside the
Farmout Area except as to the cost of using the platform from which the well is operated and
using such facilities allocated as follows:
(a)    The expense of operating and maintaining said platform shall be allocated equally to all
completions served.
(b)          The expense of operating and maintaining facilities which also serve other wells shall be
allocated on a volume throughput basis; that is to say, in the proportion that the volume throughput of
said well bears to the total volume throughput of all wells connected to the facilities.
30 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 29)
29Pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 256.73, suspension of production order suspends the running of the lease
primary term of maintains a lease in its secondary term. 30 C.F.R. § 250.10 spells out the procedure to file
for a suspension of production order and defines appropriate grounds for approval.
31 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 30)
3030 C.F.R. § 250.34-2. See the discussion at Martin, “Outer Continental Shelf Leases,” The Law of
Federal Oil and Gas Leases § 25.07[4] (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 1985).
32 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 31)
31For a discussion of the issue, generally, see Lear, Lurking Title Problems: Snares for the
Unsuspecting Federal Oil and Gas Lease Title Examination, 25 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 18-1, 18-25 to
18-36 (1979).
33 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 32)
32See generally, Terrell, “Assignments and Transfers of Interest, The Law of Federal Oil and Gas
Leases § 10.07[1] (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 1985).
34 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 33)
33Terrell, supra note 28 at § 10.07[2].
35 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 34)
34Lowe, supra note 1 at 759, 796, 773-75, 864-865. With a present assignment farmout, the farmee
gets an assignment of interest or operating rights at the time the farmout agreement is executed. More
usually, for administrative convenience, the farmee gets no assignment of interest or operating rights until
it has fully performed the farmout agreement.
36 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 35)
3543 C.F.R. §§ 3106.1(a), §§ 3106.4-1.
37 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 36)
36Terrell, supra note 32 at § 10.07[2].
38 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 37)
37Id.
39 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 38)
38For example:
Except as stated in Article IX above [an indemnification provision], Farmor and Farmee hereby
agree that the respective obligations and liabilities of the parties under this Farmout Agreement
shall be several, not joint or collective, and each party shall be responsible for its own obligations.
It is not the intention of the parties to create, nor shall this Farmout Agreement be construed as
creating, a mining or other partnership, agency or association between the parties or to render
them liable as partners, agents or associates.
For discussion of vicarious liability theories general in Farmout Agreements, see Lowe, supra note 1 at
852-855.
40 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 39)
3930 C.F.R. § 250.8.
41 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 40)
40It is a fundamental principle of tort and contract law that one is not liable for the actions of an
independent contractor or third party with an interest in the lease. Often, fee oil and gas leases specifically
embrace that principle by providing that the leasee is absolved from liability, except for its own actions,
after a partial assignment. Of course, the vicarious liability theories limit this general principle.
42 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 41)
4130 C.F.R. § 250.20.
43 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 42)
4243U.S.C. §§ 1811-1824 (1986).
44 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 43)
43Id. at § 1814.
45 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 44)
44For a discussion of insurance provisions in farmout agreements generally, see Lowe, supra note 1 at
856-857.
46 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 45)
45For example:
WATERCRAFT LIABILITY INSURANCE — [Farmee's coverage to include] Full conditions Hull
and Machinery Insurance, including war risks and collision liability, in an amount at least equal to the
market value of the vessel and its equipment. Full conditions Protection and Indemnity Insurance,
including pollution liability and removal of debris, in an amount not less than $5,000,000.00 or the
value of the vessel, whichever is greater. Umbrella Liability Insurance, over and above the Protection
and Indemnity Insurance coverage noted above in an amount not less than $2,500,000.00.
47 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 46)
46For example:
AIRCRAFT LIABILITY INSURANCE — [Farmee's coverage to include] Aircraft Hull “All Risk”
Insurance on the market value of the aircraft. Aircraft Liability Insurance with a combined single
limit of $10,000,000.00 per occurrence for bodily injury and property damage, including passenger
liability with a limit of not less than $500,000.00 per passenger seat; contractual liability applicable to
the Farmout Agreement to which this Exhibit “B” is attached.
48 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 47)
47For example:
OPERATOR'S EXTRA EXPENSE COVERAGE — [Farmee's coverage] To include seepage and
pollution liability and control of well coverage, underground blowout and redrill coverage with limits
of not less than $5,000,000.00.
49 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 48)
48For example:
[In addition to Worker's Compensation and Employers' Liability insurance, Farmee shall obtain]:
3.    Maritime endorsements to cover liability under:
(a)    Longshoremen and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (including its extension for Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Operations)
(b)  Admiralty Jurisdiction
(c)    Jones Act
(d)  Marine and Voluntary Compensation with a liability limit of not less than $1,000,000.00 per
accident
(e)          Employer's Liability coverage for masters and crew of FARMEE's vessels used in operations
with a minimum liability limit of $100,000.00 for all injuries or deaths arising out of one accident.
50 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 49)
49See Lowe, supra note 1 at 855, note 431. Whether such disclaimers will be given effect is
problematic.
51 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 50)
50For example:
Farmee shall indemnify and hold Farmor harmless, to the maximum extent permitted by law,
from and against any claims for injury, death or damage of every kind and character to persons or
property arising out of or in connection with Farmee's operations under the terms of this Farmout
Agreement upon any of the farmout lands, including deriving from acts of Farmee's contractors,
subcontractors, successors and assigns; provided that if any suit is filed on any claim, Farmee
shall immediately notify Farmor and permit Farmor to participate in the defense thereof without
waiver or impairment of Farmee's indemnities to Farmor. It is the expressed intention of the
parties hereto, both Farmee and Farmor, that the indemnity provided in this Article is indemnity
by Farmee, and Farmee's contractors, subcontractors, successors and assigns to indemnify and
protect Farmor from the consequences of Farmor's own negligence, whenever that negligence is
the concurring cause of the injury, death, or damage.
The last sentence of the quoted clause obligates the farmee to indemnify the farmor for its own
negligence. In many instances, this will not be effective, either because the language conflicts with state
Anti-Indemnity Statutes or because it is insufficiently clear. See generally, the preceding paper by
Jeanmarie B. Tade discussing Anti-Indemnity Statutes in the context of OCS operations. See also Atlantic
Richfield Company v. Petroleum Personnel, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 843 (1988), writ granted, holding that
language requiring Petroleum Personnel to indemnify Atlantic Richfield Against “any negligent act or
omission” of Atlantic Richfield was insufficient to define the parties' intent under the express negligence
doctrine, which permits indemnification of a party from the consequences of its own negligence where
that intent is “specifically stated within the four corners of the contract.” Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr.
Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. 1987).
52 (Popup - Vol 24A Ch 6 Fn 51)
51For a discussion of indemnification provisions in farmouts generally, see Lowe, supra note 1 at
857-860. For the comprehensive treatment of the subject see Tade, The Texas and Louisiana
Anti-Indemnity Statutes As Applied to Oil and Gas Industry Offshore Contracts, 24 Hous. L. Rev. 665
(1987).
